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ERSKINE MURRAY’S FATAL ADVENTURE 
IN BORNEO, 1843-44
B. R. Pearn
The career of Sir James Brooke, the "White Raja" of Sarawak, 
who a hundred and twenty years ago carved out a kingdom for him­
self on the west coast of Borneo, is familiar enough; few, how­
ever, have heard of another adventurer, contemporary with Brooke, 
who likewise tried to make a career for himself in Borneo and 
whose venture, tragic though its outcome was, also had an effect 
on the history of that part of the world. This was James 
Erskine Murray.
Murray, a member of a noble Scots family, was born May 4, 
1810, the second son of the 7th Baron Ellibank. He became a 
lawyer and was admitted as an advocate at the Scottish Bar where 
he practiced for a few years. In 1843, inspired no doubt by the 
increasing interest in Asian affairs arising from the Anglo- 
Chinese war and the British occupation of Hong Kong and by the 
attention given in the British press to Raja Brooke’s activities, 
he bought the brigantine Warlock and in her sailed to Australia 
and thence to Hong Kong.
In Hong Kong he sold the Warlock and, entering into partner­
ship with a merchant named Bowra, purchased two ships. These 
were the schooner Young Queen, 90 tons, Captain A. Hart, also 
referred to in some documents as the Yonge Queene, and the brig 
Anna, 200 tons, Captain H. Lewis. According to a subsequent 
statement by a participant in Murray’s adventure, it was general­
ly understood in Hong Kong that Murray projected an expedition 
in emulation of Raja Brooke’s occupation of Sarawak.1 With this 
prospect before them, plenty of seamen were willing to serve under 
him. He thus met no difficulty in manning his two ships with a 
total of forty seamen in addition to officers. Both crafts were 
heavily armed; the Young Queen carried an 18-pounder pivot-gun 
amidships, a 12-pounder pivot-gun on the forecastle, two 4-pound 
stern chasers, and six small pivot-guns on either broadside 
capable of discharging shot of one pound weight or charges of 
grape-shot. The brig Anna carried four 4-pounders on either 
broadside and a pivot-gun on the top gallant forecastle. Pistols, 
cutlasses and boarding-pikes were also provided. Stores and 
trade goods were taken aboard, but the heavy armament and the 
unusually large number of the two crews left barely room for a 
week’s provisions and water.
1. W. C. Cave Thomas, Murray’s Expedition to Borneo, an Episode 
in the Early Life of Edwin Robins Thomas. Ed. by Temple 
Orme (2nd-ed., London: Henderson and Spalding, [195?]), p. 1.
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On November 9, 1843, the two vessels set sail from Hong Kong, 
and a fortnight later they arrived off the Sambas River in 
western Borneo. They ascended the river to the Dutch settlement 
some fifty miles upstream where they stayed for a few days. The 
Dutch treated the expedition hospitably, and there is no evidence 
that they were much interested in its objectives. From Sambas 
they went south along the Borneo coast to the Barito River and 
up that stream to the Dutch settlement at Bandjermassin, arriving 
on the 12th December. They spent the Christmas season at 
Bandjermassin. On Christmas Day a number of the men drank too 
much and came to blows; order was restored only by the inter­
vention of Murray himself. Despite this incident, they were 
well treated at Bandjermassin, but the Dutch here were evidently 
more wide awake than their fellows at Sambas. The heavy armament 
of the two ships, the naval-style uniform worn by officers and 
men, and the discipline which was as strict as that of the Royal 
Navy, all were such as to arouse interest and suspicion.
At this time the Dutch were well established in the more 
developed islands of the East Indies. Java was completely under 
their control; they held most of the major ports of Sumatra; the 
Moluccas and the island of Celebes were in their hands. In 
Borneo, however, their hold was slender. They concentrated on 
more prosperous and profitable areas in other islands, and in 
Borneo were content to hold one or two ports on the south and 
southwest coasts. They had not extended their authority to the 
east coast or to any serious extent inland. Nevertheless, they 
regarded Borneo as being within their field of influence. It 
is, then, not surprising that the arrival of Murray’s expedition 
caused some concern and that when the two ships left Bandjermassin, 
a gunboat followed them to the mouth of the river.
At Sambas and Bandjermassin, Murray gleaned what informa­
tion he could about the coasts of Borneo, although it would seem 
from later events that this information was inadequate. He now 
made for the east coast, but after he left Bandjermassin the 
expedition’s troubles soon began. At that time, as still today, 
the seas around Borneo were much troubled by piracy, and often 
inadequately armed merchant-ships fell victim to Malay or other 
depredators. On this occasion, some Malay prahus (boats) mis­
taking the two vessels for simple merchantmen, tried to attack, 
but they were quickly beaten off by Murray’s superior armament. 
Later some more prahus were sighted. To remedy his lack of local 
knowledge, Murray hired a man from one of them to act as pilot, 
but as he promptly tried to run the two ships aground, he was 
hastily sent back to his own boat. Murray had to proceed with­
out any expert knowledge of local conditions.
Early in February, 1844, the expedition reached the mouth 
of what they called the Coti or Kuti River but what is more 
properly called the Mahakam River. The Mahakam is the most im­
portant river in south-east Borneo, and its valley was in those 
days the site of a large state, ruled by the Sultan of Kutei--
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hence the ”Coti” or ”Kuti” River. The Sultan had his capital at 
the town of Tenggarong, ninety or so miles upstream from the 
river’s mouth, and Murray therefore entered the vast delta which 
the river forms, with the intention of taking his ships up-river 
to the capital. Taking soundings all the time, and frequently 
warping the ships round bends in the river, the expedition made 
its way through the tortuous delta-creeks and so cautiously up­
stream. The survivor of the affair already cited gives a graphic 
account of this part of the voyage:
The banks of the river were densely covered with 
tropical growths--palms of great variety, cocoanuts, 
dates, Sc. Numerous monkeys made the branches of 
the trees shake when they were disturbed by either 
the boats or the vessels nearing the banks. Alli­
gators were also in force, some of large dimensions, 
and when disturbed by the flotilla passing the 
recurring mud-banks, they made either for the river 
or for the jungle; the boats’ crews had to observe 
the utmost vigilance when paying out warps. This 
warping under a tropical sun with not a breath of 
air stirring was trying in the extreme, and at sun­
down there was the mosquito torment. That the 
Malays were treacherous was an article of faith 
with the expedition, and therefore one whole watch 
was always kept up, while the watch off slept at 
their quarters.2
Murray found that between the sea and Tenggarong lay the 
town of Samarinda, some twelve miles above the head of the delta. 
Here he anchored and fired a salute. The ships’ people were 
startled when the salute was returned from a battery whose guns 
were evidently of as heavy a caliber as those they themselves 
carried. They found too, what had apparently not been previously 
realized, that the town was not in the hands of the Dayaks of 
Borneo, or even of any of the Malays who had settled much of 
the Borneo coastland, but in the hands of Bugis.
The Bugis people originated on the island of Celebes, east 
of Borneo. Their principal center had been the town of Makassar. 
In 1667 the Dutch captured Makassar and imposed on Celebes their 
usual monopolistic policy in matters of commerce. This ruined 
the Bugis, who were great seamen and traders. Having to find some 
other livelihood than honest trade, the Bugis took to piracy and 
became the terror of the East Indian seas. Some settled at the 
estuaries of rivers and from these dominated the surrounding 
countryside and the neighboring seas. Some became mercenary 
soldiers, selling their swords to any ruler in Malaya or the 
eastern archipelago who would pay them, and as a result they
2. Thomas, ojk cit., p. 4.
24
became the effective though not the nominal rulers of wide areas 
They have often been likened to the Norsemen of Europe in an 
earlier age.
The Sultanate of Kutei had shared the fate of many other 
parts of the archipelago in becoming the scene of a Bugis settle 
ment, and, as elsewhere, the Bugis dominated the local people, 
including the Sultan. As well-armed as Hurray's own expedition, 
and being courageous seamen and warriors, the Bugis could be 
formidable adversaries. If Murray was to achieve anything in 
Kutei, he must come to terms with the Bugis, but the Bugis had 
no desire to see their own trade rivalled by foreigners, still 
less to allow anyone to destroy their power in the way that Raja 
Brooke was destroying the power of the pirate chiefs on Borneo's 
west coast. How much of their attitude Murray at this time 
realized is not known, but if he had grasped the true state of 
affairs he would, it may be thought, have decided on a speedy 
retreat. Instead, he had an interview with the local ruler, who 
told him that if he wanted to trade, he must obtain permission 
from the Sultan at Tenggarong, forty miles farther upstream, and 
so the expedition went on its way, leaving a potentially hostile 
settlement between it and the open sea.
The wind gave the ships little assistance in this part of 
the voyage. Great exertions were required of the crews in pre­
venting the vessels from running aground, but in the end they 
came opposite the town of Tenggarong. Again the ships fired a 
salute and again it was returned, but this time by an obviously 
inferior armament. One of the officers, with an interpreter, 
was sent ashore with a lettdr for the Sultan, who received the 
deputation in his bamboo and thatch palace. The Sultan replied 
to the request for permission to trade by saying that though 
himself favorably disposed, he must consult his datus or chiefs, 
as was indeed the Malay practice. Next day the Sultan visited 
the ships, and the day after that as many of the ships' company 
as could safely be spared were entertained ashore at a feast. 
After the meal, Murray thought to impress his hosts with the 
strength of his expedition by holding a shooting-match against 
them. He was disconcerted to find that they were as skillful 
marksmen as any of his own party and that they could readily 
handle the "walking-stick air-gun" which he had.3
For some days after this, little happened. Chinese traders 
came alongside the two ships, selling fruit and poultry, and 
from them it was learned that some Europeans, probably English­
men, were held prisoner in Kutei, having been captured recently 
when the Sultan's prahus pirated an English ship. A boat was 
therefore sent to investigate. Up a creek off the main stream 
a ship's boat was found, but before it could be examined a body 
of local people appeared and warned the party off.
3. Thomas, o£. cit., p. 7.
25
It was now noticed that many boats containing large numbers 
of armed men were making their way downstream where they could, 
if they wished, obstruct a withdrawal by the expedition. One 
night too an attempt was made to board the ships though the 
attackers were easily repelled.
Murray now, on 13th February, called the commanders of his 
two ships into conference and, having discussed the situation, 
put his view of it into writing.1* During the time that they 
had been at Tenggarong, he wrote, he had tried by all possible 
means to gain the friendship of the people so that "a vast field 
for English enterprise and manufactures” might be opened up in 
this part of Borneo. No English ships, so far as he knew, had 
ever before come to Kutei--in this he was mistaken, for other 
evidence shows that a Mr. Dalton, a traveller and trader, spent 
more than a year there in 1827-28.4 5 But there was no doubt,
Murray continued, that a number of Europeans had been murdered 
by the Kutei people or were being kept in captivity after being 
pirated at sea. For this last reason, while seeking friendly 
relations, he had had to exercise vigilance in his dealings 
with the Sultan.
Murray went on to record that Samarinda was inhabited by 
Bugis, ”a nation of all the tribes of the Archipelago the most 
determinedly bloodthirsty and the greatest haters of Europeans.” 
They had complete control over the Sultan and his subjects and 
monopolized the trade on the river. He had hoped to open trade 
with the Sultan and with the Dayak peoples, who would gladly be 
free of their Bugis oppressors. But the Sultan proved to be a 
bad man, "whose life was one continued course of murder and 
piracy” and who was personally responsible for the pirating of 
no less than twenty-seven European ships and the murder of their 
captains. Murray had, he wrote, proposed to the Sultan that he 
himself or some other Englishman be allowed to reside at 
Tenggarong to protect any of his fellow countrymen who might come 
to trade, but for fear of the Bugis the Sultan had firmly declined. 
Yet the Sultan and his datus said that they wanted to trade with 
the English and that they hoped more English ships would come 
there. Following this, Murray had sent the Sultan samples of 
his trade goods, namely salt and tobacco, but these were sent to 
him with the message that they could be disposed of only at 
Samarinda. From this Murray concluded that the Sultan hoped to 
lure him into the hands of the Bugis and that the earlier expres­
sion of a desire for trade with Englishmen was only a device 
which might mislead traders into coming there, to their destruc­
tion. Furthermore, in the last twenty-four hours some fourteen 
guns had been stationed within a few hundred yards of the ships;
4. Public Record Office, FO 12/3.
5. J. Crawfurd, Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands 
(London: Bradbury 8 Evans, 1856), p. 202.
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houses had been pulled down to provide a field of fire. Boats 
had dropped downstream to an island below the anchorage, appar­
ently to set up a battery there, and many armed men had assembled 
near the Sultan’s palace.
Murray therefore considered whether to make his way down­
stream* This would be dangerous; if either ship were driven 
aground by the current, its crew would be in a most precarious 
position. Alternatively it might be possible to go farther in­
land and there seek the alliance of the Dayaks against the Bugis, 
but the ships were not well enough provisioned for this to be 
feasible. The solution, in his view, was to obtain hostages 
from the Sultan to ensure a safe withdrawal downstream. He must 
also, as a matter of duty, seek the release of the European 
prisoners. He wanted as well recompense for the losses incurred 
through the treatment the expedition had received, probably mean­
ing the loss imposed by the unprofitable trip to Tenggarong. He 
therefore proposed to address the Sultan, making these demands 
and saying that if the hostages were not sent aboard he would 
open fire.
Next day, the 14th February, Captain Hart of the Young 
Queen and Captain Lewis of the Anna endorsed Murray’s statement 
with the words TfI coincide with the above views” and signed it. 
The letter was not sent immediately. Perhaps Murray wished to 
give further thought to the situation. But on the night of the 
15th-16th a second attempt to board the ships was made, and 
probably this determined Murray to bring matters to a conclusion.
On the 16th morning, the letter to the Sultan was sent. It 
referred to the hostile preparations which were being made 
ashore and demanded as hostages for the good behavior of the 
Sultan and his people, that the Prime Minister, the Sultan’s 
son-in-law, the Shahbandar or Port Officer, and the Secretary 
be sent aboard, and also all Europeans and others held prisoner 
be handed over. These terms were to be complied with within 
two hours.
The ultimatum was sent ashore at 8:30 on the morning of the 
16th. By 11 o’clock no reply had been received, but there was 
much activity on shore and among the local craft lying off the 
town. Murray then fired a shot over the Sultan’s palace, and 
immediately the batteries on shore opened fire, as did war-boats 
which had been lying behind the island a little way downstream. 
The shore batteries soon found the range, and the ships began to 
suffer damage and casualties. At 12:30 the anchors were there­
fore slipped and the ships dropped down with the current aided 
by a light breeze.
As they made their way downstream, the two vessels were 
pursued by some fifty war-boats which kept up a consistent fire 
of round shot, grape and musketry. Lower down the river several 
hidden batteries opened fire. The pursuing boats were reinforced
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by others which joined them from points down the river. As the 
two sailing vessels made slow progress on account of the winding 
of the river, the pursuers were able to fire with some accuracy. 
At about 3 o’clock in the afternoon the schooner ran short of 
gunpowder and a boat had to be sent to the brig for supplies; 
this operation was effected without loss, despite the continued 
fire of the enemy. The wind changed, and by 4 o’clock was blow­
ing up the river. The current was strong enough to keep some 
way on the vessels despite the wind, but was not strong enough 
to prevent difficulties —  at one point the Anna ran into the 
bank and was got off only with the aid of a boat from the Young 
Queen. Firing by both parties in this running fight continued 
throughout the afternoon. At about 6 o’clock in the evening, 
the wind failed altogether. For better security during the 
approaching hours of darkness, when an attempt to board might 
be made, the two vessels were now lashed together.
Night was falling fast, and Samarinda was only about eight 
miles ahead. In the hope of slipping past unnoticed, the ships 
covered all lights and maintained complete silence. The dark­
ness was an asset since it brought an end to the cannonade of 
the pursuing prahus, but it made navigation along the tortuous 
river more difficult. A ship’s boat was therefore kept along­
side so as to pull the vessels round should they veer towards 
the shore, but the current, running at 4^ knots, kept the ships 
moving and able to continue safely downstream. There followed, 
says the log of the Young Queen, ’’two hours of awful suspense.’’6 
According to the log, the pursuing prahus hailed the townspeople 
as the two vessels were passing Samarinda at 8:30, so as to warn 
the Bugis what was happening. But a participant in the affair, 
writing years later, says that the Bugis were already alert and 
had placed fires on the bank opposite the town so that the 
vessels should be silhouetted against the glare.7 Whatever the 
facts about this, the Bugis ashore opened fire without, accord­
ing to the log, doing much damage, though the above-mentioned 
account by a member of the expedition refers to considerable 
damage to the ships’ spars and casualties amongst the men. The 
two vessels made no reply, so as not to show their exact posi­
tion, and the current in this part of the river being strong 
they soon drew out of gunshot from the town. The prahus main­
tained their pursuit and were joined by more boats from 
Samarinda.
It was evident that if the prahus were to be eluded, greater 
speed was essential. The two ships could therefore no longer 
proceed lashed together. Moreover, the crews were becoming 
exhausted by their prolonged efforts. Murray therefore consider­
ed concentrating his men on the Anna and abandoning the Young
6. P.R.O. FO 12/3.
7. Thomas, o£. cit., p . 11.
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Queen. He proposed to attach a time-fuse to the magazine in 
the abandoned ship, set to blow her up after the brig had drawn 
clear. However, after a conference with his officers he left a 
party of eight volunteers aboard the schooner and then cast off. 
The brig went ahead, but the schooner made slow progress. The 
former had sufficient men to man a boat which could take her in 
tow if need be, but the schooner with its small complement could 
not do this. The constant fire which the ships kept up and the 
tiredness, which no doubt affected the crews of the prahus as 
much as those of the two vessels, checked the enemy’s enthusiasm, 
and for a time the attack weakened.
At dawn the enemy renewed his efforts. Some of the prahus 
even managed to get ahead of the schooner, but she was able to 
make more sail and to catch up with the brig at the head of the 
delta. According to the statement of the survivor already cited, 
the brig now ran aground on a sandbank, and when the schooner 
tried to pass her in the hope of anchoring and rendering assist­
ance, she also grounded. A contemporary statement by the expedi­
tion’s surgeon. Dr. W. Sael, which is more likely to be accurate, 
says on the other hand that the vessels had to anchor because 
there was not enough water to cross the bar at the head of the 
delta, and the two vessels had in consequence to wait for the 
tide.^
Certainly the two ships lay helpless for some hours, and 
while they waited the attack was reinforced from an unexpected 
quarter. A Belgian ship, the Charles, had on the previous day 
grounded on a sandbank off the mouth of the river, and when at 
daybreak she became visible from the shore, a number of prahus 
came out to pillage her. The officers and crew abandoned ship 
and escaped in their small boats, eventually reaching Makassar 
in safety. The prahus returning from this successful foray 
joined those pursuing Murray’s vessels, so that the onslaught 
became more violent.
Thus, according to the surgeon’s statement, the two vessels 
were now fired on from ahead as well as astern. Murray himself 
took a hand in laying the schooner’s guns, and while so doing he 
was fatally wounded. A shot struck him in the left breast, and 
he died almost immediately. The words ”My God” were all he had 
time to utter.
Despite the loss of their commander, the ships’ crews main­
tained their resistance, and after seven hours’ hard fighting 
the tide had risen so it was possible to warp the vessels over 
the bar, though they grounded several times in the process. Once 
across the bar, they made good speed through the delta and were 
able to reach the sea without further casualties. They were 
still pursued, but when the open sea had been gained the vessels 8
8. The Times, London, 19 September, 1844.
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were able to draw ahead. The last shot in the action was fired 
at about 8 oTclock in the evening, and after that the prahus 
abandoned their pursuit.
The violence of the battle, which lasted for nearly thirty- 
six hours, is clear from the fact that the brig alone fired 720 
rounds during the action and the schooner about 500.9 Besides 
Murray, two men were killed and five wounded. Murray was buried 
at sea on the next morning, the 18th of February, 1844.
The two vessels made first for Menado, in northern Celebes, 
where the wounded were landed; one, a brother of Captain Hart, 
was later given a passage to Singapore in H.M.S. Samarang which 
was engaged in a surveying cruise in eastern seas.10 1 But the 
expedition’s misfortunes were not yet over; mutiny broke out 
on the schooner Young Queen and Captain Hart had to shoot the 
ringleader. However, they ultimately reached Hong Kong once 
more.
Murray’s disaster evoked little sympathy from his contem­
poraries in Borneo waters. He was criticized for his ’’irnpru- 
dence and unguarded conduct” which ’’brought upon himself the 
attack.”11 There is justice in this view. It is evident that 
Murray acted on inadequate information and so was led to visit 
a particularly dangerous area. If, says a contemporary, he had 
gone farther north along the Borneo coast, he would have been 
well received, for the Bugis were not established there and the 
people were friendly.12 His ignorance of local conditions thus 
caused him to commit himself to very unfriendly country. It is 
also evident that he was imprudent; wisdom should have deterred 
him from going so many miles up the river, leaving the hostile 
settlement of Samarinda between him and his way of escape.
There is some uncertainty about Murray’s real aims. It 
appears that when the expedition was under preparation in Hong 
Kong, it was generally understood that he aimed at forming a 
permanent settlement in Borneo.13 14 An officer of H.M.S.Samarang 
also says that Murray ’’attempted to establish a colony” in 
Kutei.llf In the statement by Murray which his two captains
9. The Times, op. cit., and Annual Register, 1844.
10. F. A. Marryat, Borneo and the Indian Archipelago (London: 
Longman, 1848), p. 44.
11. Ibid., p. 229.
12. E. Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang 
(London: Reeve, 1848) , p. 2 34.
13. Thomas, ojd. cit. , p. 1.
14. Marryat, o£_. cit. , p. 44.
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countersigned, he says that he had suggested to the Sultan that 
he himself, or some other Englishman— for in those days Scots 
did not scorn to refer to themselves as English— should be "al­
lowed to reside here for the protection of those of his country­
men" who might come to trade. This seems to imply a permanent 
establishment. Again, the Governor of the Straits Settlements 
wrote on 19 June 1844, that Murray "had been in treaty for a 
location in the Sultan’s dominions."15 On the other hand, the 
Governor-General of India in reporting on the disaster stated 
that "the Hon. Erskine Murray lost his life in endeavoring to 
open a commercial intercourse with the Sultan of Coti and the 
Dyak tribes, and not, as the Dutch authorities have been led to 
conclude, in attempting to establish a colony."16
On the whole, despite the views of the Governor-General, 
it seems probable that Murray aimed at more than mere trade.
This certainly, as the Governor-General indicated, was the view 
of the Dutch authorities in the archipelago. They had so far 
paid little attention to Borneo, and the activities of Raja 
Brooke had been viewed with little interest, but Murray’s adven­
ture stung them into action. It may be that they could regard 
the foundation of a British settlement in Borneo by one English­
man with indifference, but if others were to follow Brooke’s 
example, preventive action must be taken.
Following Murray’s death, the Netherlands Indies Government 
in Java sent a small naval expedition to Kutei, and a Commissioner 
was dispatched to investigate the tragedy and to strengthen the 
Dutch position on Borneo’s east coast. The Commissioner made an 
agreement with the Sultan of Kutei, who had expected to be pun­
ished for Murray’s death and so was willing to come to terms.
This agreement prohibited traders other than Dutch from settling 
in Kutei. Similar agreements were made with other rulers on the 
east coast. Early in 1846, an Administrator of the East Coast 
was appointed, with his headquarters in Kutei itself. By these 
measures the Dutch, moved by Murray’s adventure, imposed their 
rule on eastern Borneo. The steps which they took also had the 
effect of forestalling any possible punitive action by the British.
The Dutch took the matter up in London. There was an agita­
tion in the London press for the Royal Navy to take measures to 
avenge Murray. The Governor of the Straits Settlements was favor­
able to such action, but he decided to await orders from his 
superior, the Governor-General of India. The Governor-General, 
however, was not prepared to take a strong line; he did not re­
cord his reasons for this decision or lack of decision, but they 
can be readily surmised. Borneo was remote from India. It was 
certainly close to the Straits Settlements which were in those
15. P.R.O. FO 12/3.
16. Ibid.
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days part of British India and whose merchants were affected by 
piracy and lawlessness in eastern seas, but the Straits Settle­
ments were the unwanted child of India, and the Indian Govern­
ment took little interest in their affairs. The East India 
Company, too, had withdrawn from the China trade when its charter 
was renewed in 1833, and the Government of India was no longer 
interested in policing the seas on the China run. So nothing 
was done.
The Dutch, however, feared that the British would exact 
vengeance, and in August, 1844, their Minister in London pre­
sented a note warning Lord Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, that 
Kutei was a dependency of the Sultanate of Bandjermassin and so 
was part of the Netherlands Indies, and protesting against any 
punitive action there by British forces. The note also remon­
strated against Murray’s proceedings in Kutei as a violation of 
the sovereign rights of the Netherlands. Lord Aberdeen replied 
in November that he had no knowledge of Murray’s activities, 
which were entirely unofficial, and he gave an assurance that no 
action would be taken by Her Majesty’s Government which might 
infringe Netherlands sovereignty.
This was not enough for the Dutch. They then took up the 
case of Raja Brooke and complained about his activities also, 
and a long diplomatic wrangle ensued. The Dutch based their 
argument, as regards both Brooke and Murray on the Anglo-Dutch 
agreement of 17 March 1824. This agreement, designed to termin­
ate Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the eastern archipelago, provided 
that the British should withdraw from Sumatra and the Dutch with­
draw from Malaya and Singapore; the British undertook also not 
to interfere in any of the islands south of the Straits of 
Singapore. Some of the Dutch interpreted this last undertaking 
as precluding the British from intruding anywhere in the archi­
pelago south of the latitude of Singapore; the effect of the 
agreement was, they held, to draw a line through the archipelago 
on the latitude of Singapore, leaving all south of that line to 
the Netherlands. The British view, on the other hand, was that 
the undertaking referred only to the islands immediately south 
of Singapore and not to islands eastwards thereof, whatever 
their latitude. In any case, most of Borneo lay north of the 
latitude of Singapore, so the Dutch advanced the further agrument 
that the intention of the 1824 agreement was to keep British 
and Dutch apart from one another. Therefore, if the Dutch were 
settled in a part of any island, the British were bound by the 
spirit of the agreement not to intrude anywhere in that island, 
however remote from a Dutch settlement.
This wrangle went on for years intermittently, and the 
point was still being argued forty years later. Neither side 
would give way. But the Dutch were unable to prevent the British 
in 1846 from making the island of Labuan a colony or to prevent 
the extension of Raja Brooke’s territories, and thirty-odd years 
after Murray’s death the Dutch protested in vain, on grounds
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similar to those advanced in 1844-45, against the establishment 
of the British North Borneo Company.
Thus Murray's disastrous adventure had important consequences. 
It led directly to the imposition of Dutch control over the east 
coast of Borneo, and it initiated a dispute between the British 
and Netherlands Governments which continued almost to the end of 
the century. Abortive though the expedition was, it is neverthe­
less an episode of some note in the history of the eastern 
archipelago.
